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Abstract
We examine how liquidity and asset prices are affected by the following market imper-
fections: asymmetric information, participation costs, transaction costs, leverage constraints,
non-competitive behavior and search. Our model has three periods: agents are identical in the
first, become heterogeneous and trade in the second, and consume asset payoffs in the third.
We examine how imperfections in the second period affect different measures of illiquidity, as
well as asset prices in the first period. Besides nesting multiple imperfections in a single model,
we derive new results on the effects of each imperfection. Our results imply, in particular,
that imperfections do not always raise expected returns, and can influence common measures
of illiquidity in opposite directions.
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1 Introduction
Financial markets deviate, to varying degrees, from the perfect-market ideal in which there are no
impediments to trade. A large and growing body of work has identified a variety of market im-
perfections, ranging from information asymmetries, to different forms of trading costs, to financial
constraints. Most papers focus on a specific imperfection, relying on simplifications that are conve-
nient in the context of that imperfection but vary substantially across imperfections. For example,
models of trading costs typically assume life-cycle or risk-sharing motives to trade, while models of
asymmetric information often rely on noise traders. Some asymmetric-information models further
assume risk-neutral market makers who can take unlimited positions, while papers on other imper-
fections typically assume risk aversion or position limits. Missing from the literature is a systematic
analysis of different imperfections within a single, unified framework. Beyond the obvious pedagog-
ical advantages, such a framework could yield a better and more comprehensive understanding of
how imperfections affect market behavior. Indeed, effects could be compared across imperfections,
holding constant other assumptions such as trading motives and risk attitudes.
An additional limitation of the literature on market imperfections concerns the link with asset
pricing. While the effects of imperfections on market liquidity have received much attention, the
analysis of how imperfections affect expected asset returns has been more incomplete. This is partly
because simplifications that are convenient for studying liquidity are not always suitable for pricing
analysis. For example, in models with risk-neutral market-makers, expected returns are equal to
the riskless rate regardless of the imperfection’s severity. Likewise, models with exogenous noise
traders cannot address how imperfections affect noise traders’ willingness to invest. Links between
imperfections and expected returns have been drawn in some cases. Yet, this has not been done
systematically across imperfections, and not in a way that their effects can be compared.
In this paper, we develop a unified model to analyze how different imperfections affect market
behavior. We consider the following imperfections: (1) asymmetric information, (2) participation
costs, (3) transaction costs, (4) leverage constraints, (5) non-competitive behavior, and (6) search.
We determine the effect of each imperfection on liquidity, price dynamics, and expected asset
returns. We also compare effects across imperfections and derive unique empirical properties of
each imperfection. Since the imperfections that we consider have been studied in the literature,
some of our results are related to existing results. At the same time, because the effects of each
imperfection on liquidity, price dynamics, and especially expected returns have not been fully
addressed before (and not at all in some cases) many of our results are new.
Our model has three periods, t = 0, 1, 2. In Periods 0 and 1, risk-averse agents can trade a
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riskless and a risky asset that pay off in Period 2. In Period 0, agents are identical so no trade
occurs. In Period 1, agents can be one of two types. Liquidity demanders receive an endowment
correlated with the risky asset’s payoff. They can hedge their endowment by trading with liquidity
suppliers, who receive no endowment. Imperfections concern trade in Period 1. In the case of
asymmetric information, liquidity demanders observe a private signal about the payoff of the risky
asset. In the case of participation costs, agents must pay a cost to participate in the market. In
the case of transaction costs, agents must pay a cost to trade (and the difference with participation
costs is that the decision can be made conditional on trade size). In the case of leverage constraints,
agents cannot fully commit to cover losses on their loans, and this limits leverage as a function
of capital. In the case of non-competitive behavior, liquidity demanders take price impact into
account, and can possibly also observe a private signal about asset payoff. In the case of search,
agents are matched randomly with counterparties and bargain bilaterally over the price.
We consider two measures of illiquidity, both commonly used in empirical studies. The first is
Kyle’s lambda, defined in our model as the regression coefficient of the price change between Periods
0 and 1 on liquidity demanders’ signed volume in Period 1. The second is price reversal, defined as
minus the autocovariance of price changes. Price reversal provides a useful characterization of price
dynamics: it measures the importance of the transitory component in price arising from liquidity
shocks, relative to the random-walk component arising from fundamentals. Both measures of
illiquidity are positive even in the absence of imperfections. Indeed, because agents are risk-averse,
liquidity demanders’ trades move the price in Period 1 (implying that lambda is positive), and the
movement is away from fundamental value (implying that price reversal is positive). We examine
how each imperfection impacts the two measures of illiquidity and the expected return of the risky
asset. To determine the effect on expected return, we examine how the price in Period 0 is influenced
by the anticipation of imperfections in Period 1.
Table 1 summarizes the effects of each imperfection on market behavior. Results in dark (black)
color are new, in the sense that either the question has not been asked in the literature, or the
result is different than in previous papers. References to relevant papers are at the beginning of
the section covering each imperfection.
A first observation from Table 1 is that imperfections do not always raise expected return.
Consistent with previous papers, we find that expected return increases under participation costs
and transaction costs. We further show that it increases under asymmetric information, comparing
both to the case where the signal is public and the case where no agent observes the signal.
Expected return also increases under leverage constraints. The intuition for these results is that
agents are concerned that an endowment they receive in Period 1 increases the risk exposure they
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Impact of Imperfection
Type of Imperfection Lambda Price Reversal Expected Return
Asymmetric information + +/− +
Participation costs + + +
Transaction costs + + +
Leverage constraints + + +
Non-comp. behavior/Sym. info. 0 − −
Non-comp. behavior/Asym. info. + − +/−
Search +/− +/− +/−
Table 1: Impact of imperfections on illiquidity and expected returns. “Lambda” is the regression
coefficient of the price change between Periods 0 and 1 on the signed volume of liquidity demanders in Period
1; “Price Reversal” is minus the autocovariance of price changes; and “Expected Return” is the expected
return of the risky asset between Periods 0 and 2. Results in dark (black) color are new; results in light
(green) color are related to existing results.
carry from Period 0. Because imperfections hamper agents’ ability to modify their risk exposure,
they reduce their willingness to hold the risky asset in Period 0, resulting in a low price and a
high expected return. The effect can, however, reverse under non-competitive behavior because
liquidity demanders can extract better terms of trade in Period 1, and are therefore less averse to
holding the asset in Period 0. The same is true under search if liquidity demanders hold most of
the bargaining power in their bilateral meetings with suppliers.
A second observation from Table 1 is that imperfections can affect the two illiquidity measures
in opposite directions. The effect on lambda is positive, except possibly under search. At the same
time, the effect on price reversal is unambiguously positive only under participation costs, trans-
action costs and leverage constraints. The intuition for the discrepancy is that lambda measures
the price impact per unit trade, while price reversal concerns the impact of the entire trade. Im-
perfections generally raise the price impact per unit trade, but because they also reduce trade size,
the price impact of the entire trade can decrease. The second effect dominates under asymmetric
information and non-competitive behavior.
The above results have a number of empirical implications. For example, many empirical studies
seek to establish a link between illiquidity and expected asset returns. We show that the nature
of this link depends crucially on the underlying cause of illiquidity: illiquidity caused by different
imperfections can have opposite effects on expected returns. Furthermore, common measures of
illiquidity do not always reflect the underlying imperfection: our results suggest that while lambda
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is generally a valid proxy, price reversal is valid only for certain imperfections.
Further implications follow by examining how changes in exogenous parameters, other than the
imperfections themselves, affect the illiquidity measures and the expected return. We show that
when the variance of liquidity demanders’ hedging shock increases, price reversal and expected
return increase, but lambda can increase or decrease depending on the imperfection. Our results
suggest that the cross-sectional relationship between illiquidity and expected returns depends not
only on the underlying imperfection but also on other sources of cross-sectional variation. Suppose,
for example, that asymmetric information is the only imperfection. If it is also the main source of
cross-sectional variation, then expected returns should be positively related to lambda. If, however,
assets differ because of liquidity demanders’ hedging needs and not because of asymmetric infor-
mation, then expected returns should be negatively related to lambda because lambda decreases in
the variance of the hedging shock. It is therefore important to control for sources of cross-sectional
variation other than the imperfections themselves when linking illiquidity to expected returns.
Given the scope of this paper, the related literature is vast. Since our purpose here is not to
survey the literature, but present a unified model and derive new results, we reference only the
papers closest to our analysis. A more extensive and thorough review of the literature is left to a
companion survey (Vayanos and Wang (2009)). Interested readers can also refer to existing surveys
on liquidity, e.g., Amihud, Mendelson and Pedersen (2005), Biais, Glosten and Spatt (2005), and
Cochrane (2005).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and describes
each imperfection. Section 3 treats the perfect-market benchmark, and Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and
9 treat asymmetric information, participation costs, transaction costs, leverage constraints, non-
competitive behavior and search, respectively. Section 10 discusses empirical implications and Sec-
tion 11 concludes. All proofs are in an online Appendix, available at http://personal.lse.ac.uk/
vayanos/WPapers/Liquidity Vayanos Wang App.pdf.
2 Model
There are three periods, t = 0, 1, 2. The financial market consists of a riskless and a risky asset
that pay off in terms of a consumption good in Period 2. The riskless asset is in supply of B shares
and pays off one unit with certainty. The risky asset is in supply of θ¯ shares and pays off D units,
where D is normal with mean D¯ and variance σ2. Using the riskless asset as the numeraire, we
denote by St the risky asset’s price in Period t, where S2 = D.
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There is a measure one of agents, who derive utility from consumption in Period 2. Utility is
exponential,
− exp(−αC2), (2.1)
where C2 is consumption in Period 2, and α > 0 is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Agents
are identical in Period 0, and are endowed with the per capita supply of the riskless and the risky
asset. They become heterogeneous in Period 1, and this generates trade. Because all agents have the
same exponential utility, there is no preference heterogeneity. We instead introduce heterogeneity
through agents’ endowments and information.
A fraction pi of agents receive an endowment z(D − D¯) of the consumption good in Period 2,
and the remaining fraction 1− pi receive no endowment.1 The variable z is normal with mean zero
and variance σ2z , and is independent of D. While the endowment is received in Period 2, agents
learn whether or not they will receive it before trade in Period 1, in an interim period t = 1/2.
Only those agents who receive the endowment observe z, and they do so in Period 1. Since the
endowment is correlated with D, it generates a hedging demand. When, for example, z > 0, the
correlation is positive, and agents can hedge their endowment by reducing their holdings of the
risky asset. Because D and z are normal, the endowment z(D− D¯) can take large negative values,
which can generate an infinitely negative expected utility. To guarantee that utility is finite, we
assume that the variances of D and z satisfy the condition
α2σ2σ2z < 1. (2.2)
We assume normality of (D, z) for tractability, and relax or modify this assumption only in Sections
6 and 7. We denote by Wt the wealth of an agent in Period t. Wealth in Period 2 is equal to
consumption, i.e., W2 = C2.
In equilibrium, agents receiving an endowment initiate trades with others to share risk. Because
the agents initiating trades can be thought of as consuming market liquidity, we refer to them as
liquidity demanders and denote them by the subscript d. Moreover, we refer to z as the liquidity
shock. The agents who receive no endowment accommodate the trades of liquidity demanders, thus
supplying liquidity. We refer to them as liquidity suppliers and denote them by the subscript s.
Because liquidity suppliers require compensation to absorb risk, the trades of liquidity deman-
ders affect prices. Therefore, the price in Period 1 is influenced not only by the asset payoff, but
1We assume that the endowment is perfectly correlated with D for simplicity; what matters for our analysis is
that the correlation is non-zero.
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also by the liquidity demanders’ trades. Our measures of liquidity, defined in Section 3, are based
on the price impact of these trades.
Liquidity is influenced by market imperfections. We define imperfections in reference to a
perfect-market benchmark in which information is symmetric, participation and trade are costless,
agents are competitive, and the market is centralized.2 We consider six types of imperfections,
all pertaining to trade in Period 1. We maintain the perfect-market assumption in Period 0 when
determining the ex-ante effect of the imperfections, i.e., how the anticipation of imperfections in
Period 1 impacts the Period 0 price.3
Asymmetric Information
In the perfect-market benchmark, all agents have the same information about the payoff of
the risky asset. In practice, however, agents have access to different information sources, and can
differ in their ability to process information. Such differences give rise to asymmetric information
(Section 4). We assume that asymmetric information takes a simple form, where some agents
observe a private signal s about the asset payoff D in Period 1. The signal is
s = D + ² (2.3)
where ² is normal with mean zero and variance σ2² , and is independent of (D, z). We assume that
only those agents who receive an endowment observe the signal, i.e., the set of informed agents
coincides with that of liquidity demanders. Assuming that all liquidity demanders are informed
is without loss of generality: even if they do not observe the signal, they can infer it perfectly
from the price because they observe the liquidity shock. Assuming that all liquidity suppliers are
uninformed simplifies the analysis while preserving the key effects.
Participation Costs
In the perfect-market benchmark, all agents are present in the market in all periods. Thus,
a seller, for example, can have immediate access to the entire population of buyers. In practice,
however, agents face costs of market participation. Such costs include buying trading infrastructure
or membership of a financial exchange, having capital available on short notice, monitoring market
movements, etc. To model costly participation (Section 5), we assume that agents must incur a
cost c to trade in Period 1. Consistent with the notion that participation is an ex-ante decision,
2Our perfect-market benchmark has one market imperfection built in: agents cannot write contracts in Period
0 contingent on whether they are a liquidity demander or supplier in Period 1. Thus, the market in Period 0 is
incomplete in the Arrow-Debreu sense. If agents could write complete contracts in Period 0, they would not need to
trade in Period 1, in which case liquidity would not matter. In our model, complete contracts are infeasible because
whether an agent is a liquidity demander or supplier is private information.
3Imperfections in Period 0 are not relevant in our model because agents are identical in that period and there is
no trade.
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we assume that agents must decide whether or not to incur c in Period 1/2, after learning whether
or not they will receive an endowment but before observing the price in Period 1. If the decision
can be made contingent on the price in Period 1, then c is a fixed transaction cost rather than a
participation cost. We consider transaction costs as a separate market imperfection.4
Transaction Costs
In addition to costs of market participation, agents typically pay costs when executing transac-
tions. Transaction costs drive a wedge between the buying and selling price of an asset. They come
in many types, e.g., brokerage commissions, exchange fees, transaction taxes, bid-ask spreads, price
impact. Some types of transaction costs can be viewed as a consequence of other market imperfec-
tions: for example, Section 5 shows that costly participation can generate price-impact costs. Other
types of costs, such as transaction taxes, can be viewed as more primitive. We assume (Section
6) that transaction costs concern trade in Period 1, and can be proportional of fixed. Propor-
tional costs are proportional to transaction size, and for simplicity we assume that proportionality
concerns the number of shares rather than the dollar value. Denoting by κ the cost per unit of
shares traded and by θt the number of shares that an agent holds in Period t = 0, 1, proportional
costs take the form κ |θ1 − θ0|. Fixed costs are independent of transaction size and take the form
κ1{θ1 6=θ0}, i.e., the agent pays κ > 0 when trading in Period 1.
Leverage Constraints
Agents’ portfolios often involve leverage, i.e., borrow cash to establish a long position in a risky
asset, or borrow a risky asset to sell it short. In the perfect-market benchmark, agents can borrow
freely provided that they have enough resources to repay the loan. But as the Corporate Finance
literature emphasizes, various frictions can limit agents’ ability to borrow.
Since in our model consumption is allowed to be negative and unbounded from below, agents
can repay a loan of any size by reducing consumption. Negative consumption can be interpreted as
a costly activity that agents undertake in Period 2 to repay a loan. We derive a leverage constraint
by assuming that agents cannot commit to reduce their consumption below a level −A ≤ 0. This
nests the case of full commitment assumed in the rest of this paper (A = ∞), and the case where
agents can walk away from a loan rather than engaging in negative consumption (A = 0). Note that
the same leverage constraint would arise if consumption below −A is not feasible. Under the latter
interpretation, however, the constraint would not constitute an imperfection: it would amount to
4Our analysis can be extended to the case where participation is costly not only in Period 1 but also in Period
0. The cost to participate in Period 0 can be interpreted as an entry cost, e.g., learning about an asset. Entry costs
reduce the measure of agents buying the asset in Period 0, and therefore lower the price. See, for example, Huang
and Wang (2008a,b).
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redefining the utility function (2.1) as −∞ when consumption is below −A. The two interpretations
yield the same constraint and pricing implications, but differ in their welfare implications.5
Non-Competitive Behavior
In the perfect-market benchmark, all agents are competitive and have no effect on prices.
In many markets, however, some agents are large relative to others and can influence prices. To
model non-competitive behavior (Section 8), we assume that liquidity demanders behave as a single
monopolist in Period 1. We consider both the case where liquidity demanders have no private
information on asset payoffs, and the case where they observe the private signal (2.3).
Search
Both in the perfect-market benchmark and under the imperfections described so far, the market
is organized as a centralized exchange. Many markets, however, have a more decentralized form
of organization. For example, in over-the-counter markets, investors negotiate prices bilaterally
with dealers. Locating suitable counter-parties in these markets can take time and involve search.
To model decentralized markets (Section 9), we assume that agents do not meet in a centralized
exchange in Period 1, but instead must search for counterparties. With some probability they meet
a counterparty and bargain bilaterally over the price.
3 Perfect-Market Benchmark
In this section we solve the basic model described in Section 2, assuming no market imperfections.
We first compute the equilibrium, going backwards from Period 1 to Period 0. We next construct
measures of market liquidity in Period 1, and study how liquidity impacts the price dynamics and
the price level in Period 0.
3.1 Equilibrium
In Period 1, a liquidity demander chooses holdings θd1 of the risky asset to maximize the expected
utility (2.1). Consumption in Period 2 is
Cd2 =W1 + θ
d
1(D − S1) + z(D − D¯),
5While the leverage constraint in our model is linked to negative consumption, this is not the case in other
settings. For example, in Gromb and Vayanos (2002) a leverage constraint arises because liquidity suppliers exploit
price discrepancies between two correlated assets and cannot commit to use gains in one position to cover losses in
the other.
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i.e., wealth in Period 1, plus capital gains from the risky asset, plus the endowment. Therefore,
expected utility is
−Eexp{−α [W1 + θs1(D − S1) + z(D − D¯)]} , (3.4)
where the expectation is over D. Because D is normal, the expectation is equal to
− exp
{
−α
[
W1 + θd1(D¯ − S1)− 12ασ2(θd1 + z)2
]}
. (3.5)
A liquidity supplier chooses holdings θs1 of the risky asset to maximize the expected utility
− exp{−α [W1 + θs1(D¯ − S1)− 12ασ2(θs1)2]} , (3.6)
which can be derived from (3.5) by setting z = 0. The solution to the optimization problems is
straightforward and summarized in Proposition 3.1.
Proposition 3.1 Agents’ demand functions for the risky asset in Period 1 are
θs1 =
D¯ − S1
ασ2
, (3.7a)
θd1 =
D¯ − S1
ασ2
− z. (3.7b)
Liquidity suppliers are willing to buy the risky asset as long as it trades below its expected
payoff D¯, and are willing to sell otherwise. Liquidity demanders have a similar price-elastic demand
function, but are influenced by the liquidity shock z. When, for example, z is positive, liquidity
demanders are willing to sell because their endowment is positively correlated with the asset.
Market clearing requires that the aggregate demand equals the asset supply θ¯:
(1− pi)θs1 + piθd1 = θ¯. (3.8)
Substituting (3.7a) and (3.7b) into (3.8), we find
S1 = D¯ − ασ2
(
θ¯ + piz
)
. (3.9)
The price S1 decreases in the liquidity shock z. When, for example, z is positive, liquidity demanders
are willing to sell, and the price must drop so that the risk-averse liquidity suppliers are willing to
buy.
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In Period 0, all agents are identical. An agent choosing holdings θ0 of the risky asset has wealth
W1 =W0 + θ0(S1 − S0) (3.10)
in Period 1. The agent can be a liquidity supplier in Period 1 with probability 1− pi, or liquidity
demander with probability pi. Substituting θs1 from (3.7a), S1 from (3.9), and W1 from (3.10), we
can write the expected utility (3.6) of a liquidity supplier in Period 1 as
− exp{−α [W0 + θ0(D¯ − S0)− ασ2θ0(θ¯ + piz) + 12ασ2(θ¯ + piz)2]} . (3.11)
The expected utility depends on the liquidity shock z since z affects the price S1. We denote by
U s the expectation of (3.11) over z, and by Ud the analogous expectation for a liquidity demander.
These expectations are agents’ interim utilities in Period 1/2. An agent’s expected utility in Period
0 is
U ≡ (1− pi)U s + piUd. (3.12)
Agents choose θ0 to maximize U . The solution to this maximization problem coincides with the
aggregate demand in Period 0, since all agents are identical in that period and are in measure one.
In equilibrium, aggregate demand has to equal the asset supply θ¯, and this determines the price S0
in Period 0.
Proposition 3.2 The price in Period 0 is
S0 = D¯ − ασ2θ¯ − piM1− pi + piM∆1θ¯, (3.13)
where
M = exp
(
1
2α∆2θ¯
2
)√ 1 + ∆0pi2
1 + ∆0(1− pi)2 − α2σ2σ2z
, (3.14)
∆0 = α2σ2σ2z , (3.15a)
∆1 =
ασ2∆0pi
1 + ∆0(1− pi)2 − α2σ2σ2z
, (3.15b)
∆2 =
ασ2∆0
1 + ∆0(1− pi)2 − α2σ2σ2z
. (3.15c)
The first term in (3.13) is the asset’s expected payoff in Period 2, the second term is a discount
arising because the payoff is risky, and the third term is a discount due to illiquidity (i.e., low
liquidity). In the next section we explain why illiquidity in Period 1 lowers the price in Period 0.
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3.2 Illiquidity and its Effect on Price
We construct two measures of illiquidity, both based on the price impact of the liquidity demanders’
trades in Period 1. The first measure is the coefficient of a regression of the price change between
Periods 0 and 1 on the signed volume of liquidity demanders in Period 1:
λ ≡ Cov
[
S1 − S0, pi(θd1 − θ¯)
]
Var
[
pi(θd1 − θ¯)
] . (3.16)
Intuitively, when λ is large, trades have large price impact and the market is illiquid.6 Eq. (3.9)
implies that the price change between Periods 0 and 1 is
S1 − S0 = D¯ − ασ2
(
θ¯ + piz
)− S0. (3.17)
Eqs. (3.7b) and (3.9) imply that the signed volume of liquidity demanders is
pi(θd1 − θ¯) = −pi(1− pi)z. (3.18)
Eqs. (3.16)-(3.18) imply that
λ =
ασ2
1− pi . (3.19)
Illiquidity λ is higher when agents are more risk-averse (α large), the asset is riskier (σ2 large), or
liquidity suppliers are less numerous (1− pi small).
The second measure is based on the autocovariance of price changes. The liquidity demanders’
trades in Period 1 cause the price to deviate from fundamental value, while the two coincide in
Period 2. Therefore, price changes exhibit negative autocovariance, and more so when trades have
large price impact. We use minus autocovariance
γ ≡ −Cov (S2 − S1, S1 − S0) , (3.20)
as a measure of illiquidity. Besides measuring illiquidity, γ provides a useful characterization of
price dynamics: it is the variance of the transitory component in price arising from temporary
6A drawback of λ as a measure of illiquidity is that it might not reflect a causal effect of volume on prices. Suppose,
for example, that public information causes both prices and volume, but volume per se does not affect prices. “True”
illiquidity would then be zero, but λ would be large if public information has a large effect on prices and a small effect
on volume. While this issue is relevant for empirical work, it does not arise in the context of our model. Indeed,
volume is generated by shocks observable only to liquidity demanders, such as the liquidity shock z and the signal
s. Since these shocks can affect prices only through the liquidity demanders’ trades, λ measures correctly the price
impact of these trades.
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liquidity shocks. We refer to γ as price reversal and reserve the term illiquidity for λ. Eqs. (3.9),
(3.17), (3.20) and S2 = D imply that
γ = −Cov [D − D¯ + ασ2 (θ¯ + piz) , D¯ − ασ2 (θ¯ + piz)− S0] = α2σ4σ2zpi2. (3.21)
Price reversal γ is higher when agents are more risk-averse, the asset is riskier, liquidity demanders
are more numerous (pi large), and liquidity shocks are larger (σ2z large).
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Measures closely related to λ or γ are commonly used in empirical studies.8 Besides confirming
the usefulness of these measures, our model shows that the measures have different properties under
different market imperfections.
Illiquidity in Period 1 lowers the price in Period 0 through the illiquidity discount, which is the
third term in (3.13). To explain why the discount arises, consider the extreme case where trade
in Period 1 is not allowed. In Period 0, agents know that with probability pi they will receive an
endowment in Period 2. The endowment amounts to a risky position in Period 1, the size of which
is uncertain because it depends on z. Uncertainty about position size is costly (in utility terms) to
risk-averse agents. Moreover, the effect is stronger when agents carry a large position from Period
0 because the cost of holding a position in Period 1 is convex in the overall size of the position.
(The cost is the quadratic term in (3.5) and (3.6).) Therefore, uncertainty about z reduces agents’
willingness to buy the asset in Period 0.
The intuition is similar when agents can trade in Period 1. Indeed, in the extreme case where
trade is not allowed, the shadow price faced by liquidity demanders moves in response to z to the
point where these agents are not willing to trade. When trade is allowed, the price movement
is smaller, but non-zero. Therefore, uncertainty about z still reduces agents’ willingness to buy
the asset in Period 0. Moreover, the effect is weaker when trade is allowed in Period 1 than
when it is not, and therefore corresponds to a discount driven by illiquidity.9 Because the market
imperfections studied in the following sections hinder trade in Period 1, they tend to raise the
illiquidity discount in Period 0.
The illiquidity discount is the product of two terms. The first term, piM1−pi+piM , can be interpreted
as the risk-neutral probability of being a liquidity demander: pi is the true probability, and M is
7The comparative statics of autocorrelation are similar to those of autocovariance. We use autocovariance rather
than autocorrelation because normalizing by variance adds unnecessary complexity.
8Measures related to λ are, for example, the regression-based measure of Glosten and Harris (1988) and Sadka
(2006), and the ratio of average absolute returns to trading volume of Amihud (2002). Measures related to γ are, for
example, the bid-ask spread measure of Roll (1984), the Gibbs estimate of Hasbrouck (2006) and the price reversal
measure of Bao, Pan and Wang (2008). See also Campbell, Grossman and Wang (1993) and Pastor and Stambaugh
(2003) for measures based on the idea that price reversal should be higher following large trading volume.
9The comparison of illiquidity discounts under trade and no trade follows from Proposition 4.6. See Footnote 12.
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the ratio of marginal utilities of demanders and suppliers. The second term, ∆1θ¯, is the discount
that an agent would require in Period 0 if he were certain to be a demander.
The illiquidity discount is higher when liquidity shocks are larger (σ2z large) and occur with
higher probability (pi large). It is also higher when agents are more risk averse (α large), the asset
is riskier (σ2 large), and in larger supply (θ¯ large). Same comparative statics hold for the ratio
of the illiquidity discount to the discount ασ2θ¯ driven by payoff risk. Thus, while risk aversion α,
payoff risk σ2, or asset supply θ¯ raise the risk discount, they have an even stronger impact on the
illiquidity discount. For example, an increase in α raises not only the aversion of agents to the risk
of receiving a liquidity shock, but also the shock’s impact on price.
The parameter σ2z , which measures the magnitude of liquidity shocks, has different effects on
the illiquidity measures and the illiquidity discount: it has no effect on λ, while it raises γ and the
discount. The intuition is that λ measures the price impact per unit trade, while γ and S0 concern
the impact of the entire liquidity shock.
Proposition 3.3 An increase in the variance σ2z of liquidity shocks leaves illiquidity λ unchanged,
raises price reversal γ, and lowers the price in Period 0.
4 Asymmetric Information
In this section we assume that liquidity demanders observe the private signal (2.3) before trading
in Period 1. Our analysis of equilibrium in Period 1 is closely related to Grossman and Stiglitz
(1980) because we assume continua of informed and uninformed agents, and endow all informed
agents with the same signal.10 Our analysis of equilibrium in Period 0 is new, and so are the results
on how asymmetric information affects the illiquidity discount and the price reversal γ.11
10Grossman and Stiglitz model non-informational trading through exogenous shocks to the asset supply, while
we model it through an endowment received by the informed. Modeling non-informational trading through random
endowments dates back to Diamond and Verrecchia (1981), who solve a one-period model with a different information
structure than Grossman and Stiglitz. (Agents receive conditionally independent signals with the same precision.)
Wang (1994) solves an infinite-horizon model with continua of informed and uninformed agents, and models non-
informational trading through a risky production opportunity available only to the informed.
11O’Hara (2003) and Easley and O’Hara (2004) study the effect of asymmetric information on expected returns in
a multi-asset extension of Grossman and Stiglitz. They show that prices are lower and expected returns are higher
when agents receive private signals than when signals are public. This comparison concerns prices in our Period 1.
Moreover, it is driven not by asymmetric information per se but by the total amount of information agents have.
Indeed, while prices in Period 1 are lower under asymmetric information than when signals are public (maximum
total information), they are higher than under the alternative symmetric-information benchmark where no signals
are observed (minimum total information). We instead compare prices in Period 0, to determine the ex-ante effect
of the imperfection. This comparison is driven only by asymmetric information because prices are lower under
asymmetric information than under either symmetric-information benchmark. Garleanu and Pedersen (2004) study
the effect of asymmetric information on expected returns in a multi-period model with risk-neutral agents and unit
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4.1 Equilibrium
The price in Period 1 incorporates the signal of liquidity demanders, and therefore reveals in-
formation to liquidity suppliers. To solve for equilibrium, we conjecture a price function (i.e., a
relationship between the price and the signal), then determine how agents use their knowledge of
the price function to learn about the signal and formulate demand functions, and finally confirm
that the conjectured price function clears the market.
We conjecture a price function that is affine in the signal s and the liquidity shock z, i.e.,
S1 = a+ b(s− D¯ − cz) (4.1)
for three constants (a, b, c). For expositional convenience, we set ξ ≡ s− D¯ − cz. We also refer to
the price function as simply the price.
Agents use the price and their private information to form a posterior distribution about the
asset payoff D. For a liquidity demander, the price conveys no additional information relative
to observing the signal s. Given the joint normality of (D, ²), D remains normal conditional on
s = D + ², with mean and variance
E[D|s] = D¯ + βs(s− D¯), (4.2a)
σ2[D|s] = βsσ2² , (4.2b)
where βs ≡ σ2/(σ2 + σ2² ). For a liquidity supplier, the only information is the price S1, which is
equivalent to observing ξ. Conditional on ξ (or S1), D is normal with mean and variance
E[D|S1] = D¯ + βξξ = D¯ + βξ
b
(S1 − a), (4.3a)
σ2[D|S1] = βξ(σ2² + c2σ2z), (4.3b)
where βξ ≡ σ2/σ2ξ and σ2ξ ≡ σ2+σ2² +c2σ2z . Agents’ optimization problems are as in Section 3, with
the conditional distributions of D replacing the unconditional one. Proposition 4.1 summarizes the
solution to these problems.
demands. When probability distributions are symmetric (as they are in our model), they find no effect of asymmetric
information on expected returns. Ellul and Pagano (2006) show that asymmetric information in the post-IPO stage
can reduce the IPO price. The post-IPO stage, however, involves exogenous noise traders and an insider who is
precluded from bidding for the IPO.
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Proposition 4.1 Agents’ demand functions for the risky asset in Period 1 are
θs1 =
E[D|S1]− S1
ασ2[D|S1] , (4.4a)
θd1 =
E[D|s]− S1
ασ2[D|s] − z. (4.4b)
Substituting (4.4a) and (4.4b) into the market-clearing equation (3.8), we find
(1− pi)E[D|S1]− S1
ασ2[D|S1] + pi
(
E[D|s]− S1
ασ2[D|s] − z
)
= θ¯. (4.5)
The price (4.1) clears the market if (4.5) is satisfied for all values of (s, z). Substituting S1,
E[D|s], and E[D|S1] from (4.1), (4.2a) and (4.3a), we can write (4.5) as an affine equation in (s, z).
Therefore, (4.5) is satisfied for all values of (s, z) if the coefficients of (s, z) and of the constant term
are equal to zero. This yields a system of three equations in (a, b, c), solved in Proposition 4.2.
Proposition 4.2 The price in Period 1 is given by (4.1), where
a = D¯ − α(1− b)σ2θ¯, (4.6a)
b =
piβsσ
2[D|S1] + (1− pi)βξσ2[D|s]
piσ2[D|S1] + (1− pi)σ2[D|s] , (4.6b)
c = ασ2² . (4.6c)
To determine the price in Period 0, we follow the same steps as in Section 3. The calculations
are more complicated because expected utilities in Period 1 are influenced by two random variables
(s, z) rather than only z. The price in Period 0, however, takes the same general form as in the
perfect-market benchmark.
Proposition 4.3 The price in Period 0 is given by (3.13), where M is given by (3.14),
∆0 =
(b− βξ)2(σ2 + σ2² + c2σ2z)
σ2[D|S1]pi2 , (4.7a)
∆1 =
α3bσ2(σ2 + σ2² )σ
2
z
1 + ∆0(1− pi)2 − α2σ2σ2z
, (4.7b)
∆2 =
α3σ4σ2z
[
1 + (βs−b)
2(σ2+σ2² )
σ2[D|s]
]
1 + ∆0(1− pi)2 − α2σ2σ2z
. (4.7c)
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4.2 Asymmetric Information and Illiquidity
We next examine how asymmetric information impacts the illiquidity measures and the illiquidity
discount. We consider two symmetric-information benchmarks: the no-information case, where
information is symmetric because no agent observes s, and the full-information case, where all
agents observe s. The analysis in Section 3 concerns the no-information case, but can easily be
extended to the full-information case (Appendix, Proposition A.1). Illiquidity λ and price reversal γ
under full information are given by (3.19) and (3.21), respectively, where σ2 is replaced by σ2[D|s].
Proposition 4.4 Illiquidity λ under asymmetric information is
λ =
ασ2[D|S1]
(1− pi)
(
1− βξb
) . (4.8)
Illiquidity is highest under asymmetric information and lowest under full information. Moreover,
illiquidity under asymmetric information increases when the private signal (2.3) becomes more
precise, i.e., when σ2² decreases.
Under both symmetric and asymmetric information, illiquidity increases in the uncertainty
faced by liquidity suppliers, measured by their conditional variance of the asset payoff. In addition
to this uncertainty effect, a learning effect appears under asymmetric information: Because, for
example, liquidity suppliers attribute selling pressure partly to a low signal, they require a larger
price drop to buy. The learning effect corresponds to the term βξ/b in (4.8), which lowers the
denominator and raises λ.
Because of the uncertainty effect, illiquidity under full information is lower than under no infor-
mation, and illiquidity under asymmetric information tends to lie in-between. The learning effect
raises illiquidity under asymmetric information, and works in the same direction as the uncertainty
effect when comparing asymmetric to full information. The two effects work in opposite directions
when comparing asymmetric to no information, but the learning effect dominates. Illiquidity is
thus highest under asymmetric information.
Price reversal is not unambiguously highest under asymmetric information. Indeed, consider
two extreme cases. If pi ≈ 1, i.e., almost all agents are liquidity demanders (informed), then the
price processes under asymmetric and full information approximately coincide, and so do the price
reversals. Since, in addition, liquidity suppliers face more uncertainty under no information than
under full information, price reversal is highest under no information.
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If instead pi ≈ 0, i.e., almost all agents are liquidity suppliers (uninformed), then illiquidity
λ converges to infinity (order 1/pi) under asymmetric information. This is because the trading
volume of liquidity demanders converges to zero, but the volume’s informational content remains
unchanged. Because of the high illiquidity, price reversal is highest under asymmetric information.
Proposition 4.5 Price reversal γ under asymmetric information is
γ = b(b− βξ)(σ2 + σ2² + c2σ2z). (4.9)
Price reversal is lowest under full information. It is highest under asymmetric information if pi ≈ 0,
and under no information if pi ≈ 1.
While illiquidity and price reversal are lower under full information than under no information,
the comparison reverses for the illiquidity discount. This is because information reduces the scope
for risk sharing, an effect originally shown in Hirshleifer (1971). Since risk sharing is better under
no information, trade achieves larger gains, and the illiquidity discount is smaller.
Because of the Hirshleifer effect, the illiquidity discount under asymmetric information tends to
lie between the full- and no-information discounts. At the same time, asymmetric information raises
illiquidity in Period 1 because of the learning effect. The learning effect raises the discount and
works in the same direction as the Hirshleifer effect when comparing asymmetric to no information.
The two effects work in opposite directions when comparing asymmetric to full information, but the
learning effect dominates. The illiquidity discount is thus highest under asymmetric information.12
Proposition 4.6 The price in Period 0 is lowest under asymmetric information and highest under
no information.
The comparative statics with respect to the variance σ2z of liquidity shocks are the same as in
the perfect-market benchmark case, except for the illiquidity λ. Under asymmetric information, an
increase in σ2z lowers λ because liquidity shocks make prices less informative and attenuate learning.
Proposition 4.7 An increase in the variance σ2z of liquidity shocks lowers illiquidity λ, raises price
reversal γ, and lowers the price in Period 0.
12Proposition 4.6 implies that the illiquidity discount under no trade is larger than in the perfect-market benchmark.
Indeed, the perfect-market benchmark corresponds to the no-information case. On the other hand, no trade occurs
in the full-information case if the signal (2.3) is perfect (σ2² = 0) because there is no scope for risk sharing.
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5 Participation Costs
In this section we assume that agents must incur a cost c to participate in the market in Period 1.
Our analysis of participation decisions and equilibrium in Period 1 is closely related to Grossman
and Miller (1988), and of equilibrium in Period 0 to Huang and Wang (2008a,b).13 Our result on
how participation costs affect the illiquidity λ is new.
5.1 Equilibrium
The price in Period 1 is determined by the participating agents. We look for an equilibrium where
all liquidity demanders participate, but only a fraction µ > 0 of liquidity suppliers do. Market
clearing requires that the aggregate demand of participating agents equals the asset supply held by
these agents. Since in equilibrium agents enter Period 1 holding θ¯ shares of the risky asset, market
clearing takes the form
(1− pi)µθs1 + piθd1 = [(1− pi)µ+ pi] θ¯. (5.1)
Agents’ demand functions are as in Section 3. Substituting (3.7a) and (3.7b) into (5.1), we find
that the price in Period 1 is
S1 = D¯ − ασ2
[
θ¯ +
pi
(1− pi)µ+ piz
]
. (5.2)
We next determine the measure µ of participating liquidity suppliers, assuming that all liquidity
demanders participate. If a supplier participates, he submits the demand function (3.7a) in Period
1. Since participation entails a cost c, wealth in Period 1 is
W1 =W0 + θ0(S1 − S0)− c. (5.3)
Using (3.7a), (5.2) and (5.3), we can compute the interim utility U s of a participating supplier in
Period 1/2. If the supplier does not participate, holdings in Period 1 are the same as in Period 0
(θs1 = θ0), and wealth in Period 1 is given by (3.10). We denote by U
sn the interim utility of a
non-participating supplier in Period 1/2.
13Grossman and Miller assume participation costs for liquidity suppliers only, while we assume such costs for all
agents. Huang and Wang’s analysis is more general than ours in two respects. First, they assume no aggregate
liquidity shocks and derive aggregate order imbalances as a consequence of participation costs. We assume instead
an aggregate liquidity shock, in a spirit similar to Pagano (1989) and Allen and Gale (1994). Second, they consider
general parameter values, while we limit attention to values under which liquidity demanders always participate.
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The participation decision is derived by comparing U s to U sn for the equilibrium choice of
θ0, which is θ¯. If the participation cost c is below a threshold c, then all suppliers participate
(µ = 1). If c is above c and below a larger threshold c¯, then suppliers are indifferent between
participating or not (U s = U sn), and only some participate (0 < µ < 1). Increasing c within
that region reduces the fraction µ of participating suppliers, while maintaining the indifference
condition. This is because with fewer participating suppliers, competition becomes less intense,
enabling the remaining suppliers to cover their increased participation cost. Finally, if c is above
c¯, then no suppliers participate (µ = 0).
Proposition 5.1 Suppose that all liquidity demanders participate. Then, the fraction of partici-
pating liquidity suppliers is
µ = 1, if c ≤ c ≡ log
(
1 + α2σ2σ2zpi
2
)
2α
, (5.4a)
µ =
pi
1− pi
(
ασσz√
e2αc − 1 − 1
)
, if c < c < c¯ ≡ log
(
1 + α2σ2σ2z
)
2α
, (5.4b)
µ = 0, if c ≥ c¯. (5.4c)
We next determine the participation decisions of liquidity demanders, taking those of liquidity
suppliers as given.
Proposition 5.2 Suppose that a fraction µ > 0 of liquidity suppliers participate. Then, a sufficient
condition for all liquidity demanders to participate is
(1− pi)µ ≥ pi. (5.5)
Eq. (5.5) requires that the measure pi of liquidity demanders does not exceed the measure
(1 − pi)µ of participating suppliers. Intuitively, when demanders are the short side of the market,
they stand to gain more from participation, and can therefore cover the participation cost (since
suppliers do). Combining Propositions 5.1 and 5.2, we find:
Corollary 5.1 An equilibrium where all liquidity demanders and a fraction µ > 0 of liquidity
suppliers participate exists under the sufficient conditions pi ≤ 1/2 and c ≤ cˆ ≡ log
(
1+14α
2σ2σ2z
)
2α .
For pi ≤ 1/2 and c ≤ cˆ, only two equilibria exist: the one in the corollary and the one where
no agent participates. The same is true for pi larger but close to 1/2, and for c larger but close to
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cˆ.14 When, however, c exceeds a threshold in (cˆ, c¯), the equilibrium in the corollary ceases to exist,
and no-participation becomes the unique equilibrium.
To determine the price in Period 0, we follow the same steps as in Section 3. The price takes
a form similar to that in the perfect-market benchmark.
Proposition 5.3 The price in Period 0 is given by (3.13), where
M = exp
(
1
2α∆2θ¯
2
)√√√√√ 1 + ∆0 pi2[(1−pi)µ+pi]2
1 + ∆0
(1−pi)2µ2
[(1−pi)µ+pi]2 − α2σ2σ2z
, (5.6)
∆1 =
ασ2∆0 pi(1−pi)µ+pi
1 + ∆0
(1−pi)2µ2
[(1−pi)µ+pi]2 − α2σ2σ2z
, (5.7a)
∆2 =
ασ2∆0
1 + ∆0
(1−pi)2µ2
[(1−pi)µ+pi]2 − α2σ2σ2z
, (5.7b)
and ∆0 is given by (3.15a).
5.2 Participation Costs and Illiquidity
We next examine how participation costs impact the illiquidity measures and the illiquidity dis-
count. Proceeding as in Section 3, we can compute the illiquidity λ and price reversal γ:
λ =
ασ2
(1− pi)µ, (5.8)
γ =
α2σ4σ2zpi
2
[(1− pi)µ+ pi]2 . (5.9)
Both measures are inversely related to the fraction µ of participating liquidity suppliers. Proposition
5.3 implies that the illiquidity discount is also inversely related to µ.
We derive comparative statics for the equilibrium in Corollary 5.1, and consider only the
region c > c, where the measure µ of participating suppliers is less than one. This is without
14Other equilibria are ruled out by the following argument. Prices and trading profits in Period 1 depend only the
relative measures of participating suppliers and demanders. Therefore, if participation occurs, the fraction of either
suppliers or demanders must (generically) equal one. If the fraction of demanders is less than one, then the fraction
of suppliers must equal one. This is a contradiction for pi ≤ 1/2 because of (5.5). It is also a contradiction for pi
larger but close to 1/2 because (5.5) is a sufficient condition: because liquidity demanders face the risk of liquidity
shocks, they can benefit from participation more than suppliers even when they are the long side of the market. See
Huang and Wang for a more detailed discussion of the nature of equilibrium under costly participation.
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loss of generality: in the region c ≤ c, where all suppliers participate, prices are not affected by
the participation cost and are as in the perfect-market benchmark. When c > c, an increase in
the participation cost lowers µ, and therefore raises illiquidity, price reversal and the illiquidity
discount.
Proposition 5.4 Consider the equilibrium in Corollary 5.1, and assume c > c. An increase in the
participation cost c raises illiquidity λ and price reversal γ, and lowers the price in Period 0.
Consider next an increase in the variance σ2z of liquidity shocks. Since liquidity supply becomes
more profitable, there is more participation by suppliers and illiquidity λ decreases. Price reversal
remains unchanged, however, because of two offsetting effects. Holding the measure of participating
suppliers constant, an increase in σ2z raises price reversal for the same reasons as in the perfect-
market benchmark. At the same time, increased participation lowers price reversal. The effects
exactly offset because the profits of participating suppliers depend on σ2z only through the price
reversal. Since profits in equilibrium must equal the participation cost, price reversal is independent
of σ2z .
Proposition 5.5 Consider the equilibrium in Corollary 5.1, and assume c > c. An increase in the
variance σ2z of liquidity shocks lowers illiquidity λ, leaves price reversal γ unchanged, and lowers
the price in Period 0.
6 Transaction Costs
In this section we assume that agents incur a transaction cost when trading in Period 1. The
difference with the participation cost of the previous section is that the decision whether or not to
incur the transaction cost is contingent on the price in Period 1. We mainly focus on the case where
the transaction cost is proportional to transaction size, as measured by the number of shares, and
consider the more complicated case of fixed costs at the end of this section. We assume that the
liquidity shock z is drawn from a general distribution that is symmetric around zero with density
f(z); specializing to a normal distribution does not simplify the analysis. Our analysis is closest
to Lo, Mamaysky and Wang (2004) because we examine how transaction costs affect prices in a
setting where agents trade to share risk. Lo, Mamaysky and Wang assume fixed costs, while we
focus on proportional costs.15 Our results on how transaction costs affect the illiquidity λ and price
15Equilibrium with proportional costs has mainly been studied in settings where agents trade because of life-cycle
or consumption-smoothing motives, rather than risk sharing. See, for example, Amihud and Mendelson (1986),
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reversal γ are new.
6.1 Equilibrium
Transaction costs generate a bid-ask spread in Period 1. An agent buying one share pays the price
S1 plus the transaction cost κ, and so faces an effective ask price S1 + κ. Conversely, an agent
selling one share receives S1 but pays κ, and so faces an effective bid price S1 − κ. The bid-ask
spread is independent of transaction size because transaction costs are proportional. Because of the
spread, trade occurs only if the liquidity shock z is sufficiently large. Suppose, for example, that
z > 0, in which case liquidity demanders value the asset less than liquidity suppliers. If liquidity
suppliers buy, their demand function is as in Section 3 (Eq. (3.7a)), but with S1 + κ taking the
place of S1, i.e.,
θs1 =
D¯ − S1 − κ
ασ2
. (6.1)
Conversely, if liquidity demanders sell, their demand function is as in Section 3 (Eq. (3.7b)), but
with S1 − κ taking the place of S1, i.e.,
θd1 =
D¯ − S1 + κ
ασ2
− z. (6.2)
Since in equilibrium agents enter Period 1 holding θ¯ shares of the risky asset, trade occurs if there
exists a price S1 such that θs1 > θ¯ and θ
d
1 < θ¯. Using (6.1) and (6.2), we can write these conditions
as
κ < D¯ − S1 − ασ2θ¯ < ασ2z − κ.
Therefore, trade occurs if z > 2κ
ασ2
≡ κˆ, i.e., the liquidity shock z is large relative to the transaction
cost κ. The price can be determined by substituting (6.1) and (6.2) into the market-clearing
equation (3.8). Repeating the analysis for z < 0, we can derive the following proposition.
Proposition 6.1 The equilibrium in Period 1 is as follows:
• |z| ≤ κˆ: Agents do not trade;
Vayanos (1998, 2004), Vayanos and Vila (1999), Huang (2002), and Acharya and Pedersen (2005) for life-cycle
motives, and Aiyagari and Gertler (1991) and Heaton and Lucas (1996) for consumption-smoothing motives. See also
Constantinides (1986) who derives general-equilibrium implications of transaction costs from a partial-equilibrium
setting where an agent engages in dynamic portfolio rebalancing. The trading frequencies implied by the various
motives differ: they are low for life cycle and consumption smoothing and higher for portfolio rebalancing and risk
sharing.
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• |z| > κˆ: All agents trade and the price is
S1 = D¯ − ασ2
[
θ¯ + piz + κˆ
(
1
2 − pi
)
sign(z)
]
. (6.3)
The effect of transaction costs on the price depends on the relative measures of liquidity suppli-
ers and demanders. Suppose, for example, that z > 0. In the absence of transaction costs, liquidity
demanders sell and the price drops. Because transaction costs deter liquidity suppliers from buying,
they tend to depress the price, amplifying the effect of z. At the same time, transaction costs deter
liquidity demanders from selling, and this tends to raise the price, dampening the effect of z. The
overall effect depends on agents’ relative measures. If pi < 1/2 (more suppliers than demanders),
the impact on suppliers dominates, and transaction costs amplify the effect of z. The converse holds
if pi > 1/2. The price in Period 0 takes a form similar to that in the perfect-market benchmark.16
Proposition 6.2 The price in Period 0 is given by (3.13), where
M =
∫ κˆ
0 exp
(
1
2α
2σ2z2
)
ch(α2σ2θ¯z)f(z)dz +
∫∞
κˆ Γ(z)ch(α
2σ2θ¯z)f(z)dz∫ κˆ
0 f(z)dz +
∫∞
κˆ exp
[− 12α2σ2pi2(z − κˆ)2] f(z)dz , (6.4)
∆1 =
ασ2
[∫ κˆ
0 exp
(
1
2α
2σ2z2
)
sh
(
α2σ2θ¯z
)
zf(z)dz +
∫∞
κˆ Γ(z)sh(α
2σ2θ¯z)[piz + (1− pi)κˆ]f(z)dz
]
θ¯
[∫ κˆ
0 exp
(
1
2α
2σ2z2
)
ch(α2σ2θ¯z)f(z)dz +
∫∞
κˆ Γ(z)ch(α
2σ2θ¯z)f(z)dz
] ,
(6.5)
Γ(z) = exp
[
1
2α
2σ2z2 − 12α2σ2(1− pi)2(z − κˆ)2
]
. (6.6)
6.2 Transaction Costs and Illiquidity
We next examine how transaction costs impact the illiquidity measures and prices. Because trans-
action costs deter liquidity suppliers from trading, they raise illiquidity λ. Note that λ rises even
16Extending our analysis to fixed costs is more complicated because agents’ optimization problems become non-
convex. Non-convexity can give rise to multiple solutions, meaning that agents of the same type (suppliers or
demanders) can fail to take the same action. Suppose, for example, that all agents start with the same position
θ0 = θ¯ in Period 0. As with proportional costs, all agents trade in Period 1 if the liquidity shock z is large, while
no agent trades if z is small. For intermediate values of z, however, some agents pay the fixed cost and trade, while
others of the same type do not trade.
A further complication arising from non-convexity is that θ0 = θ¯ is not an equilibrium. Indeed, consider a deviation
from θ0 = θ¯ in either direction. The trades that become profitable in the margin are those whose surplus equals the
fixed cost. But while the net surplus of these trades is zero, the marginal surplus (i.e., the derivative with respect to
θ0) is non-zero. Thus, expected utility at θ0 = θ¯ has a local minimum and a kink, implying that identical agents in
Period 0 choose different positions in equilibrium.
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when transaction costs dampen the effect of the liquidity shock z on the price. Indeed, dampening
occurs not because of enhanced liquidity supply, but because liquidity demanders scale back their
trades.
Proposition 6.3 Illiquidity λ is
λ =
ασ2
1− pi
[
1 +
κˆ
2pi
∫∞
κˆ (z − κˆ) f(z)dz∫∞
κˆ (z − κˆ)2 f(z)dz
]
, (6.7)
and is higher than without transaction costs (κ = 0).
Defining price reversal γ involves a slight complication because for small values of z there is
no trade in Period 1, and therefore the price S1 is not uniquely defined. We define price reversal
conditional on trade in Period 1. The empirical counterpart of our definition is that no-trade
observations are dropped from the sample. Transaction costs affect price reversal both because
they limit trade to large values of z, and because they impact the price conditional on trade
occuring. The first effect raises price reversal. The second effect works in the same direction when
transaction costs amplify the effect of z on the price, i.e., when pi < 1/2.
Proposition 6.4 Price reversal γ is
γ = α2σ4
∫∞
κˆ
[
piz +
(
1
2 − pi
)
κˆ
]2
f(z)dz∫∞
κˆ f(z)dz
. (6.8)
It is increasing in the transaction cost coefficient κ if pi ≤ 1/2.
Because transaction costs hinder trade in Period 1, a natural conjecture is that they raise the
illiquidity discount. When, however, pi ≈ 1, transaction costs can lower the discount. The intuition
is that for pi ≈ 1 liquidity suppliers are the short side of the market and stand to gain the most
from trade. Therefore, transaction costs hurt them the most, and reduce the utility differential
between suppliers and demanders. This lowers the risk-neutral probability of being a demander,
and can lower the discount. Transaction costs always raise the discount when pi ≤ 1/2.
Proposition 6.5 The price in Period 0 is decreasing in the transaction cost coefficient κ if pi ≤ 1/2.
We can sharpen the results of Propositions 6.4 and 6.5 by assuming specific distributions for
the liquidity shock z. When z is drawn from a two-point distribution, transaction costs raise price
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reversal γ for all values of pi, but lower the illiquidity discount for pi ≈ 1. When z is normal,
transaction costs raise γ for all values of pi, and numerical calculations suggest that they also raise
the discount for all values of pi.
To derive comparative statics with respect to the variance σ2z of z, we assume again specific
distributions. When z is drawn from a two-point distribution, an increase in σ2z lowers λ, while the
effects on γ and the discount are as in the perfect-market benchmark. Same comparative statics
on (λ, γ) hold when z is normal, and numerical solutions suggest same comparative statics on the
discount. The intuition why λ decreases in σ2z is that when liquidity shocks are large, the main
determinant of λ is not the bid-ask spread, which is affected by transaction costs, but the suppliers’
risk aversion. Since the relative importance of the bid-ask spread decreases when σ2z increases, λ
decreases. Proposition 6.6 summarizes the results in the case of a two-point distribution.
Proposition 6.6 Suppose that z is drawn from a two-point distribution, and trade occurs in Period
1 (σz > κˆ). Illiquidity λ and price reversal γ are increasing in the transaction cost coefficient κ.
An increase in the variance σ2z of liquidity shocks lowers illiquidity λ, raises price reversal γ, and
lowers the price in Period 0.
7 Leverage Constraints
In this section we assume that agents’ leverage is limited as a function of their capital. We derive
a leverage constraint from agents’ inability to commit to cover losses on levered positions solely by
reducing consumption. For simplicity, we assume that agents must be able to cover losses in full.
To ensure that such commitment is possible despite the lower bound on consumption, we replace
normal distributions by distributions with bounded support.17 We denote the support of the asset
payoff D by [D¯− bD, D¯+ bD] and that of the liquidity shock z by [−bz, bz]. We assume that D and
z are distributed symmetrically around their respective means, D is positive (i.e., D¯−bD ≥ 0), and
agents receive a positive endowment B of the riskless asset in Period 0. Because our focus is on
how the leverage constraint influences the supply of liquidity, we impose it on liquidity suppliers
only. Our analysis is closest to Gromb and Vayanos (2002), who study the supply of liquidity by
17The assumption that losses must be covered in full is also implicit in the perfect-market benchmark. Dropping
this assumption and allowing for default would expand the set of payoffs beyond those achieved by the traded assets.
Suppose, for example, that an agent borrows cash to buy the risky asset. If the agent can default, his payoff is that
of a call option on the risky asset. See Geanakoplos (2003) for a general analysis of margin contracts and an example
where allowing for default entails no loss of generality.
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leverage-constrained agents.18 In Gromb and Vayanos, liquidity is supplied by arbitrageurs who
trade two correlated zero-supply assets across segmented markets. We assume instead one risky
asset in positive supply, and add an ex-ante stage (Period 0) where all agents are identical. Our
analysis of how leverage constraints affect the illiquidity discount (computed in the ex-ante stage
before liquidity shocks occur) is new.
7.1 Equilibrium
In Period 1, a liquidity demander chooses holdings θd1 of the risky asset to maximize the expected
utility (3.4). The expectation over D is
− exp
{
−α
[
W1 + θd1(D¯ − S1)− f(θd1 + z)
]}
, (7.1)
where
f(θ) ≡ log E exp
[−αθ(D − D¯)]
α
. (7.2)
Eq. (7.1) generalizes (3.5), derived under normality, to any symmetric distribution. The func-
tion f(θ), equal to 12αθ
2 under normality, is positive, symmetric around the y-axis, and convex.19
Maximizing (7.1) over θd1 yields the demand function
θd1 =
(
f ′
)−1 (D¯ − S1)− z. (7.3)
Since f(θ) is convex, the demand θd1 is a decreasing function of the price S1.
A liquidity supplier chooses holdings θs1 of the risky asset to maximize the expected utility
− exp{−α [W1 + θs1(D¯ − S1)− f(θs1)]} , (7.4)
which can be derived from (7.1) by setting z = 0. The optimization is subject to a leverage
constraint. Indeed, losses from investing in the risky asset can be covered by wealthW1 or negative
18See also Geanakoplos (2003) and Geanakoplos and Zame (2009) for a general formulation of equilibrium with
collateral and margin contracts. Kyle and Xiong (2001) and Xiong (2001) consider settings where liquidity suppliers
face no leverage constraints but have logarithmic preferences. Logarithmic preferences require that consumption is
non-negative. At the same time, because the marginal utility at zero consumption is infinite, the leverage constraint
implied by non-negative consumption never binds.
19The function αf(θ) is the cumulant-generating function of −α(D−D¯). Cumulant-generating functions are convex.
Symmetry follows because D is distributed symmetrically around D¯. Positivity follows from f(0) = 0, symmetry and
convexity.
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consumption. Since suppliers must be able to cover losses in full, and cannot commit to consume
less than −A, losses cannot exceed W1 +A, i.e.,
θs1(S1 −D) ≤W1 +A for all D.
This yields the constraint
m|θs1| ≤W1 +A, (7.5)
where
m ≡ S1 −min
D
D if θs1 > 0, (7.6a)
m ≡ max
D
D − S1 if θs1 < 0. (7.6b)
The constraint (7.5) requires that a position of θs1 shares is backed by capital m|θs1|. This limits the
size of the position as a function of the capital W1+A available to suppliers in Period 1. Suppliers’
capital is the sum of the capital W1 that they physically own in Period 1, and the capital A that
they can access through their commitment to consume −A in Period 2. The parameter m is the
required capital per share of levered position, and can be interpreted as a margin or haircut. The
margin is equal to the maximum possible loss per share. For example, the margin for a long position
does not exceed the asset price S1, and is strictly smaller if the asset payoff D has a positive lower
bound (i.e., minDD = D¯ − bD > 0).
Intuitively, the constraint (7.5) can bind when there is a large discrepancy between the price
S1 and the expected payoff D¯, since this is when liquidity suppliers want to hold large positions.
There is, however, a countervailing effect because of a decrease in the margin. When, for example,
S1 is low, suppliers want to hold large long positions, but the margin is small because the maximum
possible loss is small. The required capital (position size times margin) increases in the discrepancy
between S1 and D¯ under the sufficient condition
2αpibDbz < 1, (7.7)
which for simplicity we assume from now on.
Proposition 7.1 The equilibrium in Period 1 has the following properties:
• The leverage constraint (7.5) never binds if
B +A+ θ¯(D¯ − bD)− pibz
[
bD − f ′(θ¯ + pibz)
] ≥ 0. (7.8)
Otherwise, (7.5) binds for z ∈ [−bz,−z) ∪ (z, bz], where 0 < z < z ≤ bz.
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• An increase in z lowers the price S1 and raises the liquidity suppliers’ position θs1. When
(7.5) does not bind, θs1 = θ¯ + piz and
S1 = D¯ − f ′(θ¯ + piz). (7.9)
The leverage constraint never binds if agents receive a large endowment B of the riskless asset
in Period 0, or if they can commit to a large negative consumption −A in Period 2. In both cases,
the capital that they can access in Period 1 is large. If instead B and A are small, the constraint
binds for large positive and possibly large negative values of the liquidity shock z. For example,
when z is large and positive, the price S1 is low and liquidity suppliers are constrained because
they want to hold large long positions. Setting
K∗ ≡ pibz
[
bD − f ′(θ¯ + pibz)
]− θ¯(D¯ − bD),
we refer to the region B+A > K∗, where liquidity suppliers are well-capitalized and the constraint
never binds, as the abundant-capital region, and to the region B + A < K∗, where the constraint
binds for some values of z, as the scarce-capital region. Note that in both regions, the constraint
does not bind for z = 0. Indeed, the unconstrained outcome for z = 0 is that liquidity suppliers
maintain their endowments θ¯ of the risky asset and B of the riskless asset. Since this yields positive
consumption, the constraint is met.
An increase in the liquidity shock z lowers the price S1 and raises the liquidity suppliers’
position θs1. These results are the same as in the perfect-market benchmark of Section 3, but the
intuition is more complicated when the leverage constraint binds. Suppose that capital is scarce
(i.e., B + A < K∗), and z is large and positive, in which case suppliers hold long positions and
are constrained. The intuition why they can buy more, despite the constraint, when z increases
is as follows. Since the price S1 decreases, suppliers realize a capital loss on the θ¯ shares of the
risky asset that they carry from Period 0. This reduces their wealth in Period 1 and tightens the
constraint. At the same time, a decrease in S1 triggers an equal decrease in the margin (7.6a)
for long positions, and loosens the constraint. This effect is equivalent to a capital gain on the θs1
shares that suppliers hold in Period 1. Because suppliers are net buyers for z > 0 (i.e., θs1 > θ¯), the
latter effect dominates, and suppliers can buy more in response to an increase in z.
To determine the price in Period 0, we make the simplifying assumption that the risk-aversion
coefficient α is small. We denote by (σ2, σ2z) the variances of (D, z), by k ≡ E[D−D¯]
4
σ4
−3 the curtosis
of D, by F (z) the cumulative distribution function of z, and by o(αn) terms smaller than αn.
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Proposition 7.2 Suppose that α is small. The price in Period 0 is
S0 = D¯ − ασ2θ¯ − α3σ4
[(
1 + 12k
)
σ2zpi
2 + 16kθ¯
2
]
θ¯ + o(α3) (7.10)
when capital is abundant, and
S0 = D¯ − ασ2θ¯ − ασ2(1− pi)
[∫ z
z
(z − z)dF (z) +
∫ bz
z
(z − z)dF (z)
]
+ o(α) (7.11)
when capital is scarce.
7.2 Leverage Constraints and Illiquidity
We next examine how the leverage constraint impacts the illiquidity measures and the illiquidity
discount. We compute these variables in the abundant-capital region (liquidity suppliers are well-
capitalized and unconstrained by leverage for all values of the liquidity shock z), and compare with
the scarce-capital region.
Proposition 7.3 Suppose that α is small or z is drawn from a two-point distribution. Illiquidity
λ is higher when capital is scarce than when it is abundant.
Proposition 7.4 Price reversal γ is higher when capital is scarce than when it is abundant.
The intuition is as follows. When the liquidity shock z is close to zero, the constraint does not
bind in both the abundant- and scarce-capital regions, and therefore price and volume are identical
in the two regions. For larger values of z, the constraint binds when capital is scarce, impairing
suppliers’ ability to accommodate an increase in z. As a result, an increase in z has a larger effect
on price and a smaller effect on volume when capital is scarce. Since the effect on price is larger, so
is the price reversal γ. Illiquidity λ is also larger because it measures the price impact per unit of
volume. Note that λ measures an average price impact, i.e., the average slope of the relationship
between price change and signed volume. This relationship exhibits an important non-linearity
when capital is scarce: the slope increases for large values of z, which is when the constraint binds.
This property distinguishes leverage constraints from other imperfections.
The illiquidity discount is higher when capital is scarce. This is because the leverage constraint
binds asymmetrically: it is more likely to bind when liquidity demanders sell (z > 0) than when
they buy (z < 0). Indeed, the constraint binds when the suppliers’ position is large in absolute
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value—and a large position is more likely when suppliers buy in Period 1 because this adds to the
long position θ¯ that they carry from Period 0. Since price movements in Period 1 are exacerbated
when the constraint binds, and the constraint is more likely to bind when demanders sell, the
average price in Period 1 is lower when capital is scarce. This yields a lower price in Period 0.
Proposition 7.5 Suppose that α is small. The price in Period 0 is lower when capital is scarce
than when it is abundant.
We next consider an increase in the magnitude of liquidity shocks. We scale up all shocks
uniformly, replacing z by ωz for a scalar ω > 1.20
Proposition 7.6 Suppose that α is small, and all liquidity shocks are multiplied by ω > 1.
• If under the new distribution capital is abundant, then illiquidity λ remains the same (to the
highest order in α), price reversal γ increases, and the price in Period 0 decreases.
• If under the new distribution capital is scarce, then illiquidity λ increases, price reversal γ
increases, and the price in Period 0 decreases.
The comparative statics when capital is abundant are the same as for the perfect-market
benchmark of Section 3. When instead capital is scarce, an increase in the shocks’ magnitude
increases illiquidity. This result is different than for other imperfections, and is due to the non-
linearity of the relationship between price change and signed volume: the relationship becomes
stronger when the constraint binds, and the constraint is more likely to bind when shocks are
larger.
Our analysis can be extended to the case where the leverage constraint (7.5) holds with a
margin m that is constant, rather than a function of price as in (7.6a)-(7.6b). A constant margin
yields different implications for how liquidity suppliers respond to an increase in the liquidity shock
z: while their position θs1 increases under the margin (7.6a)-(7.6b), it can decrease under a constant
margin. Indeed, suppose that suppliers hold long positions and are constrained. An increase in z
lowers S1, triggering a capital loss and a tightening of the constraint. Under the margin (7.6a)-
(7.6b), there is the countervailing and dominant effect that the margin decreases. This effect does
not exist under a constant margin, and therefore suppliers are forced to sell. Liquidity suppliers
thus consume liquidity: in response to selling pressure by demanders, they sell (to demanders).
20Other sections consider an increase in the variance σ2z of liquidity shocks, assuming a normal or a two-point
distribution. This is equivalent to scaling up all shocks uniformly.
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This yields amplification: following an increase in the liquidity shock z, the price drops, triggering
sales by suppliers, amplifying the price drop, triggering more sales, etc. In particular, the price
drop is larger than in the suppliers’ absence.21
8 Non-Competitive Behavior
In this section we assume that liquidity demanders behave as a single monopolist in Period 1. We
consider both the case where liquidity demanders have no private information on asset payoffs,
and so information is symmetric, and the case where they observe the private signal (2.3), and so
information is asymmetric. (The second case nests the first by setting the variance σ2² of the signal
noise to infinity.) We show that strategic behavior by liquidity demanders influences the supply of
liquidity, even though liquidity suppliers are competitive. The trading mechanism in Period 1 is
that liquidity suppliers submit a demand function and liquidity demanders submit a market order,
i.e., a price-inelastic demand function. Restricting liquidity demanders to trade by market order
is without loss of generality: since they know all available information in Period 1, they know the
demand function of liquidity suppliers. Our analysis of equilibrium in Period 1 is closely related to
Bhattacharya and Spiegel (1991) because we assume that an informed monopolist with a hedging
motive trades with competitive risk-averse agents.22 Our analysis of equilibrium in Period 0 is new,
and so are the results on how non-competitive behavior affects the illiquidity discount and the price
reversal γ.
8.1 Equilibrium
We conjecture that the price in Period 1 has the same affine form (4.1) as in the competitive case,
with possibly different constants (a, b, c). Given (4.1), the demand function of liquidity suppliers is
(4.4a) as in the competitive case. Substituting (4.4a) into the market-clearing equation (3.8), and
21Amplification can arise even in the presence of countervailing variation in margins, and for constraints derived
endogenously in the spirit of (7.5). See, for example, Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and Geanakoplos (2003).
22Strategic behavior under asymmetric information has mainly been studied in a setting introduced by Kyle (1985),
where strategic informed traders trade with competitive risk-neutral market makers and noise traders. Risk neutrality
simplifies the derivations, but also eliminates any effect of illiquidity on expected returns. Indeed, expected returns
are equal to the riskless rate because market makers are competitive and risk-neutral. See also Glosten and Milgrom
(1985), Easley and O’Hara (1987) and Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) for other settings with competitive risk-neutral
market makers and noise traders.
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using (4.3a), yields the price in Period 1 as a function of the liquidity demanders’ market order θd1 :
S1(θd1) =
D¯ − βξb a+ ασ
2[D|S1]
1−pi (piθ
d
1 − θ¯)
1− βξb
. (8.1)
Liquidity demanders choose θd1 to maximize the expected utility
−Eexp
{
−α
[
W1 + θd1
(
D − S1(θd1)
)
+ z(D − D¯)
]}
. (8.2)
The difference with the competitive case is that liquidity demanders behave as a single monopolist
and take into account the impact of their order θd1 on the price S1. Proposition 8.1 characterizes
the solution to the liquidity demanders’ optimization problem.
Proposition 8.1 The liquidity demanders’ market order in Period 1 satisfies
θd1 =
E[D|s]− S1(θd1)− ασ2[D|s]z + λˆθ¯
ασ2[D|s] + λˆ , (8.3)
where λˆ ≡ dS1(θd1)
dθd1
= αpiσ
2[D|S1]
(1−pi)
(
1−βξ
b
) .
Eq. (8.3) determines θd1 implicitly because it includes θ
d
1 in both the left- and the right-hand side.
We write θd1 in the form (8.3) to facilitate the comparison with the competitive case. Indeed, the
competitive counterpart of (8.3) is (4.4b), and can be derived by setting λˆ to zero. The parameter λˆ
measures the price impact of liquidity demanders, and is closely related to the illiquidity λ. Because
in equilibrium λˆ > 0, the denominator of (8.3) is larger than that of (4.4b), and therefore θd1 is less
sensitive to changes in E[D|s]−S1 and z than in the competitive case. Intuitively, because liquidity
demanders take price impact into account, they trade less aggressively in response to their signal
and their liquidity shock.
Substituting (4.4a) and (8.3) into the market-clearing equation (3.8), and proceeding as in
Section 4, we find a system of three equations in (a, b, c). Proposition 8.2 solves this system.
Proposition 8.2 The price in Period 1 is given by (4.1), where
b =
piβsσ
2[D|S1] + (1− pi)βξσ2[D|s]
2piσ2[D|S1] + (1− pi)σ2[D|s] , (8.4)
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and (a, c) are given by (4.6a) and (4.6c), respectively. The linear equilibrium exists if σ2² > σˆ
2
² ,
where σˆ2² is the positive solution of
α2σˆ4²σ
2
z = σ
2 + σˆ2² . (8.5)
The price in the competitive market in Period 0 can be determined through similar steps as in
previous sections.
Proposition 8.3 The price in Period 0 is given by (3.13), where
M = exp
(
1
2α∆2θ¯
2
)√√√√ 1 + ∆0pi2
1 + ∆0
(
1 + 2λˆ
ασ2[D|s]
)
(1− pi)2 − α2σ2σ2z
, (8.6)
∆1 =
α3bσ2(σ2 + σ2² )σ
2
z
1 + ∆0
(
1 + 2λˆ
ασ2[D|s]
)
(1− pi)2 − α2σ2σ2z
, (8.7a)
∆2 =
α3σ4σ2z
[
1 +
α(βs−b)2(σ2+σ2² )(ασ2[D|s]+2λˆ)
(ασ2[D|s]+λˆ)2
]
1 + ∆0
(
1 + 2λˆ
ασ2[D|s]
)
(1− pi)2 − α2σ2σ2z
, (8.7b)
and ∆0 is given by (4.7a).
8.2 Non-Competitive Behavior and Illiquidity
We next examine how non-competitive behavior impacts the illiquidity measures and the illiquidity
discount.
Proposition 8.4 Illiquidity λ is given by (4.8). It is the same as under competitive behavior when
information is symmetric, and higher when information is asymmetric.
Although illiquidity is given by the same equation as under competitive behavior, it is higher
when behavior is non-competitive because the coefficient b is smaller. Intuitively, when liquidity
demanders take price impact into account, they trade less aggressively in response to their signal
and their liquidity shock. This reduces the size of both information- and liquidity-generated trades.
The relative size of the two types of trades remains the same, and so does price informativeness,
measured by the signal-to-noise ratio. Monopoly trades thus have the same informational content
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as competitive trades, but are smaller in size. As a result, the signal per trade size is higher, and
so is the price impact of trades and the illiquidity λ. Non-competitive behavior has no effect on
illiquidity when information is symmetric because trades have no informational content.
An increase in information asymmetry, through a reduction in the variance σ2² of the signal
noise, generates an illiquidity spiral. Because illiquidity increases, liquidity demanders scale back
their trades. This raises the signal per trade size, further increasing illiquidity. When information
asymmetry becomes severe, illiquidity becomes infinite and trade ceases, leading to a market break-
down. This occurs when σ2² ≤ σˆ2² , i.e., for values of σ2² such that the equilibrium of Proposition 8.2
does not exist. Non-competitive behavior is essential for the non-existence of an equilibrium with
trade because such an equilibrium always exists under competitive behavior.23
Proposition 8.5 Price reversal γ is given by (4.9), and is lower than under competitive behavior.
Although price reversal is given by the same equation as under competitive behavior, it is
lower when behavior is non-competitive because the coefficient b is smaller. Intuitively, price re-
versal arises because the liquidity demanders’ trades in Period 1 cause the price to deviate from
fundamental value. Under non-competitive behavior, these trades are smaller and so is price re-
versal. Note that non-competitive behavior has opposite effects on the two illiquidity measures:
illiquidity λ increases but price reversal γ decreases.
While illiquidity λ is higher under non-competitive behavior, the illiquidity discount can be
lower. This is because liquidity demanders scale back their trades, rendering the price less responsive
to their liquidity shock and obtaining better insurance against the shock. This effect drives the
illiquidity discount below the competitive value when information is symmetric. When information
is asymmetric, the comparison can reverse. This is because the scaling back of trades generates the
spiral of increasing illiquidity, and this reduces the insurance received by liquidity demanders.
Proposition 8.6 The price in Period 0 is higher than under competitive behavior when information
is symmetric, but can be lower when information is asymmetric.
The comparative statics with respect to the variance σ2z of liquidity shocks are the same as
under competitive behavior.
23There exist settings, however, where asymmetric information leads to market breakdowns even with competitive
agents. See Akerlof (1970) for a setting where agents trade heterogeneous goods of different qualities, and Glosten
and Milgrom (1985) for an asset-market setting.
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Proposition 8.7 An increase in the variance σ2z of liquidity shocks leaves illiquidity λ unchanged
under symmetric information but lowers it under asymmetric information. It raises price reversal
and lowers the price in Period 0.
9 Search
In this section we assume that agents do not meet in a centralized exchange in Period 1, but
instead must search for counterparties. When a liquidity demander meets a supplier, they bargain
bilaterally over the terms of trade, i.e., the number of shares traded and the share price. We assume
that bargaining leads to an efficient outcome, and denote by φ ∈ [0, 1] the fraction of transaction
surplus appropriated by suppliers. We denote by N the measure of bilateral meetings between
demanders and suppliers. This parameter characterizes the efficiency of the search process, and
is bounded by min{pi, 1 − pi} since there cannot be more meetings than demanders or suppliers.
Assuming that all meetings are equally likely, the probability of a demander meeting a supplier is
pid ≡ N/pi, and of a supplier meeting a demander is pis ≡ N/(1 − pi). Our analysis is closest to
Duffie, Garleanu and Pedersen (2008), who study asset-market search in a continuous-time model
where agents’ positions can take one of two values and there are aggregate liquidity shocks.24 In
our model search occurs only within one period, but positions can be arbitrary.25 Furthermore, we
are able to compute the illiquidity λ and price reversal γ, and examine how they depend on the
search friction.26
9.1 Equilibrium
Prices in Period 1 are determined through pairwise bargaining between liquidity demanders and
suppliers. Agents’ outside option is not to trade and retain their positions from Period 0, which in
equilibrium are equal to θ¯. The consumption in Period 2 of a liquidity supplier who does not trade
in Period 1 is Csn2 =W0 + θ¯(D − S0). This generates a certainty equivalent
CEQsn =W0 + θ¯(D¯ − S0)− 12ασ2θ¯2, (9.1)
24Duffie, Garleanu and Pedersen (2005) employ a similar model but restrict attention to deterministic steady states.
25Garleanu (2009) allows for arbitrary positions in a deterministic steady-state model.
26Duffie, Garleanu and Pedersen (2008) show in the context of numerical examples that prices recover more slowly
from shocks in a search market than in a centralized market. Besides computing price reversal in closed form, we
show that it is not always higher in a search market.
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where the first two terms are the expected consumption, and the third a risk adjustment quadratic
in position size. If the supplier buys x shares at price S1, the certainty equivalent becomes
CEQs =W0 + θ¯(D¯ − S0) + x(D¯ − S1)− 12ασ2(θ¯ + x)2 (9.2)
because the position becomes θ¯+x. Likewise, the certainty equivalent of a liquidity demander who
does not trade in Period 1 is
CEQdn =W0 + θ¯(D¯ − S0)− 12ασ2(θ¯ + z)2, (9.3)
and if the demander sells x shares at price S1, the certainty equivalent becomes
CEQd =W0 + θ¯(D¯ − S0)− x(D¯ − S1)− 12ασ2(θ¯ + z − x)2. (9.4)
Under efficient bargaining, x maximizes the sum of certainty equivalents CEQs + CEQd. The
maximization yields x = z/2, i.e., the liquidity shock is shared equally between the two agents.
The price S1 is such that the supplier receives a fraction φ of the transaction surplus, i.e.,
CEQs − CEQsn = φ
(
CEQs + CEQd − CEQsn − CEQdn
)
. (9.5)
Proposition 9.1 When a supplier and a demander meet in Period 1, the supplier buys z/2 shares
at the price
S1 = D¯ − ασ2
[
θ¯ + 14z(1 + 2φ)
]
. (9.6)
Eq. (9.6) implies that the impact of the liquidity shock z on the price in Period 1 increases in
the liquidity suppliers’ bargaining power φ. When, for example, z > 0, liquidity demanders need
to sell, and greater bargaining power by suppliers results in a lower price. Comparing (9.6) to its
centralized-market counterpart (3.9) reveals an important difference: price impact in the search
market depends on the distribution of bargaining power within a meeting, characterized by the
parameter φ, while price impact in the centralized market depends on aggregate demand-supply
conditions, characterized by the measures (pi, 1−pi) of demanders and suppliers.27 The price in the
centralized market in Period 0 can be determined through similar steps as in previous sections.
27That φ is the sole determinant of price impact in the search market is a special feature of our model, where search
occurs only within one period. When instead agents’ outside option is to search again (as in, e.g., Duffie, Garleanu
and Pedersen (2005, 2008)), price impact is influenced not only by φ, but also by the measures of liquidity demanders
and suppliers and the efficiency of the search process.
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Proposition 9.2 The price in Period 0 is
S0 = D¯−ασ2θ¯−
N(1+φ)
2G
3
2
2
exp
(
α4σ4σ2z θ¯
2
2G2
)
+ pi−N
G
3
2
3
exp
(
α4σ4σ2z θ¯
2
2G3
)
N√
G1
+ 1− pi −N + N√
G2
exp
(
α4σ4σ2z θ¯
2
2G2
)
+ pi−N√
G3
exp
(
α4σ4σ2z θ¯
2
2G3
)α3σ4σ2z θ¯, (9.7)
where
G1 = 1 + 12φα
2σ2σ2z ,
G2 = 1− 12(1 + φ)α2σ2σ2z ,
G3 = 1− α2σ2σ2z .
9.2 Search and Illiquidity
We next examine how the search friction impacts the illiquidity measures and the illiquidity dis-
count. We perform two related but distinct exercises: compare the search market with the central-
ized market of Section 3, and vary the measure N of meetings between liquidity demanders and
suppliers.
When N decreases, the search process becomes less efficient and trading volume decreases.
At the same time, the price in each meeting remains the same because it depends only on the
distribution of bargaining power within the meeting. Since illiquidity λmeasures the price impact of
volume, it increases. One would expect that λ in the search market is higher than in the centralized
market because only a fraction of suppliers are involved in bilateral meetings and provide liquidity
(N ≤ 1− pi). Proposition 9.3 confirms this result when bargaining power is symmetric (φ = 1/2).
The result is also true when suppliers have more bargaining power than demanders (φ > 1/2)
because the liquidity shock has then larger price impact. Moreover, the result extends to all values
of φ when less than half of suppliers are involved in meetings (N ≤ (1− pi)/2).
Proposition 9.3 Illiquidity λ is
λ =
ασ2(1 + 2φ)
2N
, (9.8)
and increases when the measure N of meetings decreases. It is higher than in the centralized market
if φ+ 1/2 ≥ N/(1− pi).
Because the price in the search market is independent of N , so is the price reversal γ. Moreover,
γ in the search market is higher than in the centralized market if φ is large relative to pi.
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Proposition 9.4 Price reversal γ is
γ =
α2σ4σ2z(1 + 2φ)
2
16
, (9.9)
and is independent of the measure N of meetings. It is higher than in the centralized market if
φ+ 1/2 ≥ 2pi.
When the measure N of meetings decreases, agents are less likely to trade in Period 1, and a
natural conjecture is that the illiquidity discount increases. Proposition 9.5 confirms this conjecture
under the sufficient condition φ ≤ 1/2. Intuitively, if φ ≈ 1, a decrease in the measure of meetings
does not affect liquidity demanders because they extract no surplus from a meeting. Since, however,
liquidity suppliers become worse off, the risk-neutral probability of being a demander decreases,
and the price can increase.28
Proposition 9.5 A decrease in the measure N of meetings lowers the price in Period 0 if φ ≤ 1/2.
The comparative statics with respect to the variance σ2z of liquidity shocks are as in the case
of a centralized market.
Proposition 9.6 An increase in the variance σ2z of liquidity shocks leaves illiquidity λ unchanged,
raises price reversal γ, and lowers the price in Period 0.
10 Empirical Implications
In this section we explore implications of our model for empirical studies of liquidity.
10.1 Liquidity and Expected Returns
The concept of liquidity is central to certain areas of Finance such as market microstructure or
optimal trade execution. Yet, its importance for asset valuation remains unclear. Many empirical
studies seek to establish a link between liquidity and expected asset returns.29 The basic premise
in these studies is that illiquidity is positively related to expected returns. Our analysis shows that
28The illiquidity discount in the search market is higher than in the centralized market if φ is large relative to pi.
This property is the same as for λ and γ, but the calculations are more complicated.
29The survey by Amihud, Mendelson and Pedersen (2006) includes detailed references.
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the nature of this relationship depends crucially on the underlying cause of illiquidity. Indeed, while
imperfections such as asymmetric information, participation costs, transaction costs, and leverage
constraints raise expected returns, other imperfections such as non-competitive behavior and search
can have the opposite effect. Since many imperfections can exist simultaneously in the market, the
relationship between illiquidity and expected returns can become ambiguous. Identifying the main
imperfection in specific contexts could help better estimate this relationship.
Even when the theoretical relationship between illiquidity and expected returns is unambiguous,
confirming this relationship empirically in a cross-section of assets can be challenging. This is
because cross-sectional variation can be driven by factors other than the imperfections themselves.
For example, Table 2 summarizes how the variance σ2z of liquidity shocks influences illiquidity
and expected returns. Under all six imperfections, larger σ2z leads to higher expected returns.
The impact on lambda, however, is negative under asymmetric information, participation costs,
transaction costs and non-competitive behavior. To explain why this might complicate cross-
sectional tests, suppose, for example, that asymmetric information is the only imperfection. If it is
also the main source of cross-sectional variation, then Table 1 implies a positive relationship between
lambda and expected returns. If, however, asymmetric information is the same across assets and
differences arise because of σ2z , then Table 2 implies a negative relationship. The same is true
under participation costs, transaction costs, and non-competitive behavior. Therefore, our results
on how factors other than the imperfections affect illiquidity and expected returns are relevant for
cross-sectional tests. Knowing the effects of these factors, and finding suitable empirical controls,
could help identify more precisely the effects of illiquidity.
10.2 Measures of Liquidity
A key question when studying liquidity is how to measure it empirically. Many measures have
been proposed, some derived in the context of a specific model (e.g., Kyle’s lambda) and some
more heuristically. Within our unified model, we can evaluate the validity of these measures across
a variety of imperfections. We show that lambda is a good measure of imperfections because it
generally increases in the imperfections’ presence. On the other hand, price reversal can decrease
under asymmetric information, non-competitive behavior and search. The benefits of lambda rela-
tive to price reversal must be set against some drawbacks. First, lambda might not reflect a causal
effect of volume on prices (see Footnote 6). Second, estimating lambda requires information on
signed trades which might not be available, while estimating price reversal requires information
only on transaction prices. Putting these issues aside, a broad implication of our analysis is that
the validity of a measure of illiquidity can depend of the underlying imperfection.
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Impact of Variance of Liquidity Shocks
Type of Imperfection Lambda Price Reversal Expected Return
Perfect-market benchmark 0 + +
Asymmetric information − + +
Participation costs − 0 +
Transaction costs − + +
Leverage constraints + + +
Non-comp. behavior/Sym. info. 0 + +
Non-comp. behavior/Asym. info. − + +
Search 0 + +
Table 2: Impact of the variance of liquidity shocks on illiquidity and expected returns. “Lambda”
is the regression coefficient of the price change between Periods 0 and 1 on the signed volume of liquidity
demanders in Period 1; “Price Reversal” is minus the autocovariance of price changes; and “Expected
Return” is the expected return of the risky asset between Periods 0 and 2.
Both lambda and price reversal are unconditional measures: lambda measures the average
slope of the relationship between price change and signed volume, and price reversal measures
the unconditional autocovariance. Our analysis has further implications for conditional measures.
Consider, for example, the conditional lambda, defined as the sensitivity of price to signed volume
conditional on signed volume. Under asymmetric information, participation costs, non-competitive
behavior and search, the relationship between price and signed volume is linear, and therefore
conditional and unconditional lambdas coincide. Under leverage constraints, however, the price is
more sensitive to signed volume for large values of volume because this is when constraints bind.
The opposite is true under transaction costs. Indeed, taking the price for zero volume to be the mid-
point of the bid-ask spread, the price jumps discontinuously to the ask following arbitrarily small
buy volume, and then increases continuously (thus becoming less sensitive to volume). Therefore,
lambda conditional on large volume is larger than unconditional lambda under leverage constraints
and smaller under transaction costs. These properties could help test for the presence of specific
imperfections, or could themselves be tested in contexts where the imperfections can be identified.
11 Conclusion
We develop a unified model to examine how market imperfections affect liquidity and expected asset
returns. Our model encompasses the following imperfections: asymmetric information, participa-
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tion costs, transaction costs, leverage constraints, non-competitive behavior and search. Besides
nesting these imperfections in a single model, we derive new results on the effects of each imper-
fection. Our results imply, in particular, that imperfections do not always raise expected returns,
and can influence common measures of illiquidity in opposite directions.
One extension of our analysis is to consider interactions between imperfections. A natural
interaction, studied in this paper, is between non-competitive behavior and asymmetric information.
Other interactions, e.g., between asymmetric information and participation costs, could be studied
as well. A related and more fundamental extension is to explore the economic links between
imperfections. For example, if participation costs are costs to monitor market information, can
costly participation be derived as a consequence of asymmetric information? Such an extension
could provide more guidance on the nature of different imperfections and their relative significance.
At a more technical level, our analysis could be extended to more general assumptions concerning
each imperfection (e.g., multiple signals in the case of asymmetric information), and to a dynamic
setting where imperfections manifest themselves over several periods. Finally, the comparison of
effects across imperfections could be performed not only at the qualitative level, as in this paper,
but also quantitatively for plausible parameter values.
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